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Abstract— The increasing complexity of modern robotic sys-
tems and the environments they operate in necessitates the
formal consideration of safety in the presence of imperfect
measurements. In this paper we propose a rigorous framework
for safety-critical control of systems with erroneous state
estimates. We develop this framework by leveraging Control
Barrier Functions (CBFs) and unifying the method of Backup
Sets for synthesizing control invariant sets with robustness
requirements—the end result is the synthesis of Measurement-
Robust Control Barrier Functions (MR-CBFs). This provides
theoretical guarantees on safe behavior in the presence of imper-
fect measurements and improved robustness over standard CBF
approaches. We demonstrate the efficacy of this framework
both in simulation and experimentally on a Segway platform
using an onboard stereo-vision camera for state estimation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Safety is of utmost importance in many modern control
applications, including autonomous vehicles, medical and
industrial robotics [1]. The growing complexity of these sys-
tems demands that safety properties are rigorously encoded
in the controller design. Such systems are typically described
as safe if their state never leaves a prescribed safe set,
and Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) [2], [3] have become
increasingly popular [4], [5] as a tool for achieving safety.
In this paper, we focus on two challenges related to safety-
critical control realized via CBFs: finding admissible inputs
and making these inputs robust to uncertainty.
The first challenge is guaranteeing that a safe control input
is always available. If safe control actions exist—i.e., satisfy
input constraints—over the entire safe set, the set is called
control invariant [6]. Yet control invariance is not guaranteed
in general—safe actions may not exist for all points in
a given safe set. Therefore, identifying control invariant
sets is critically important for implementing safety-critical
controllers in robotic systems. Hamilton-Jacobi reachability
analysis can be performed to compute such sets [7], but is
intractable for high dimensional systems. Here we adapt the
method of Backup Sets introduced in [8] as a computationally
tractable way of achieving control invariance.
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Fig. 1. Visualization of desired Segway behavior. The Segway is driven
from left to right and must not cross the red line. The transparent blue
images of the Segway represent the measured position whereas the opaque
images represent the true position. Traditional CBFs do not account for this
uncertainty.
The second challenge is that controllers rely on state mea-
surements that are often imperfect or uncertain—especially
for dynamic robotic systems. This can cause unsafe behavior
if not accounted for in the control design and, as such,
has been addressed from multiple perspectives. The work
in [9], [10] considers robust CBF formulations with worst-
case disturbance bounds to achieve safety. Safety guarantees
in the presence of measurement noise are addressed from a
stochastic perspective in [11], [12]. Controllers robust to state
estimation errors were proposed for sampled-data-systems
via an interval-arithmetic condition in [13] and for contin-
uous systems via estimate-error bounding in [14]. In [14]
safety and robustness were enforced by Measurement-Robust
Control Barrier Functions (MR-CBFs). This approach was
inspired by vision-based control [15], [16], [17], where state
information is observed through a complex transformation.
This paper presents a safety-critical control framework that
allows for the synthesis of control invariant sets that are
robust to measurement uncertainty, all with a view toward
experimental realization. The main contributions of this work
are twofold. Firstly, we integrate the method of Backup Sets
for ensuring control invariance [8] with the framework of
MR-CBFs [14]. This leads to practically achievable safety
guarantees even in the presence of measurement uncertainty,
establishing measurement-robust safety-critical control. Sec-
ondly, we present the first experimental demonstration of
both MR-CBFs and the proposed method by controlling the
motion of a Segway using camera data. The experiments
validate the robust safety guarantees provided by our method.
II. PRELIMINARIES
First we provide a review of safety-critical control through
























invariant sets via the Backup Set method.
A. Control Barrier Functions
Consider the nonlinear control affine system given by:
ẋ = f(x) + g(x)u, x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm, (1)
where f : Rn → Rn and g : Rn → Rn×m are locally Lips-
chitz continuous. Given a locally Lipschitz continuous con-
troller k : Rn → Rm, the closed-loop dynamics are:
ẋ = fcl(x) = f(x) + g(x)k(x), (2)
where fcl : Rn → Rn is also locally Lipschitz continuous.
Therefore, for any initial condition x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn there
exists an interval I(x0) , [0, tmax) such that x(t) is the
unique solution to (2) for t ∈ I(x0) [18]. Throughout this
paper we assume I(x0) = [0,∞).
The notion of safety is formalized by defining a safe set
C ⊂ Rn in the state space that the system must remain within.
In particular, consider the set C as the 0-superlevel set of a
continuously differentiable function h : Rn → R:
C , {x ∈ Rn : h(x) ≥ 0},
∂C , {x ∈ Rn : h(x) = 0},
Int(C) , {x ∈ Rn : h(x) > 0}.
(3)
We assume that zero is a regular value of h and C is non-
empty and has no isolated points, that is, h(x) = 0 =⇒
∂h
∂x (x) 6= 0, Int(C) 6= ∅, and Int(C) = C. In this context,
safety is synonymous with the forward invariance of C:
Definition 1 (Forward Invariance and Safety). A set C ⊂ Rn
is forward invariant if for every x0 ∈ C, the solution to (2)
satisfies x(t) ∈ C for all t ≥ 0. The closed-loop system (2)
is safe with respect to set C if C is forward invariant.
We call a continuous function α : R→ R as extended
class-K∞ (K∞,e) if it is strictly monotonically increas-
ing and satisfies α(0) = 0, limr→−∞ α(r) = −∞, and
limr→∞ α(r) =∞. Control Barrier Functions (CBF) can
be used to synthesize controllers ensuring the safety of the
closed-loop system (2) with respect to a given set C.
Definition 2 (Control Barrier Function (CBF), [2]). Let
C ⊂ Rn be a safe set given by (3). The function h is a Control
Barrier Function (CBF) for (1) on C if there exists α ∈ K∞,e















where Lfh : Rn → R and Lgh : Rn → Rm are the Lie
derivatives of h with respect to f and g, respectively.
Intuitively, the CBF constraint (4) requires a system to
slow down as it approaches the boundary of the safe set
(the right-hand side of (4) increases to 0 as the value of h
approaches 0). A main result in [19], [20] relates CBFs to
the safety of the closed-loop system (2) with respect to C:
Theorem 1. Given a safe set C ⊂ Rn, if h is a CBF for
(1) on C, then any locally Lipschitz continuous controller
k : Rn → Rm satisfying
Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)k(x) ≥ −α(h(x)) (5)
for all x ∈ C, renders the system (2) safe w.r.t. C.
Given a nominal (but not necessarily safe) locally Lips-
chitz continuous controller kd : Rn → Rm and a CBF h, the






s.t. Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u ≥ −α(h(x)).
B. Generating Control Invariant Sets via Backup Sets
To guarantee that a safe control action exists, one needs to
ensure the existence of a function h satisfying the CBF con-
dition (4). For a given safe-set C, fulfilling this requirement
can be nontrivial and potentially impossible. To this end, we
restrict our focus to a set CI ⊆ C which is control invariant:
Definition 3 (Control Invariance). A set CI ⊆ C is control
invariant if there exists a controller k : Rn → Rm such that
CI is forward invariant with respect to the system (2).
While directly computing control invariant sets remains
challenging in general, we may define one implicitly via
a backup set [8]. Consider a desired safe set C ⊂ Rn,
which is not necessarily control invariant. Suppose there
exists a set CB ⊂ C, defined as the 0-superlevel set of a
continuously differentiable function hB : Rn → R, which is
known a priori to be control invariant and can be rendered
forward invariant by a known locally Lipschitz continuous
backup controller kB : Rn → Rm. We refer to CB as the
backup set. For simple backup controllers (such as linear
state feedback controllers designed for the linearization of a
system) it is possible to find analytical expressions for local
regions of attraction to serve as backup sets. Alternatively,
numerical tools such as Sums-of-Squares (SOS) may be used
to synthesize control invariant sets [21].
We extend the backup set to a larger control invariant set
CI ⊂ Rn, satisfying CB ⊆ CI ⊆ C, by considering the backup
trajectory over a finite and fixed time T ∈ R>0 as follows.
By assumption, for any x ∈ Rn there exists a unique solution
ϕ : [0, T ]→ Rn satisfying:
d
dτ
ϕ(τ) = f(ϕ(τ)) + g(ϕ(τ))kB(ϕ(τ)),
ϕ(0) = x.
(6)
The solution ϕ may be interpreted as the evolution of the
system over the interval [0, T ] from a state, x, under the
backup controller kB . In particular, the current state x(t)
may be used as initial condition in specifying ϕ. We denote
φkbτ (x) , ϕ(τ) for the initial condition x.
Using this notation, we may define the set CI ⊆ C as:
CI =

h(φkBτ (x)) ≥ 0,∀τ ∈ [0, T ]
x ∈ C and
hB(φ
kB
T (x)) ≥ 0
 . (7)
The first inequality implies safety under the backup policy
(φkBτ (x) ∈ C for all τ ∈ [0, T ]), and the second inequal-
ity implies the backup trajectory reaches CB by time T
(φkBT (x) ∈ CB). The set CI is thus control invariant as there
exists at least one controller, kB , which renders it forward
invariant. While CI is not necessarily the largest control
invariant subset of C (see viability kernel, [6]), the backup
sets provide a computationally tractable method for finding
an under-approximation of the largest control invariant set.
For notational simplicity, we define the continuously dif-
ferentiable functions hτ : Rn → R and hB : Rn → R as:
hτ (x) , h(φ
kB
τ (x)), hB(x) , hB(φ
kB
T (x)). (8)
Given these definitions, the CBF condition (4) can then be
specified for the set CI at a point x ∈ CI as follows:
Lfhτ (x) + Lghτ (x)u ≥ −α(hτ (x)), ∀τ ∈ [0, T ],
LfhB(x) + LghB(x)u ≥ −α(hB(x)).
(9)
Any locally Lipschitz continuous controller that takes values
satisfying (9) for all x ∈ CI will keep the closed loop system
(2) safe with respect to CI ; see [22, p. 6].
We note that enforcing the first constraint in (9) is not
necessarily tractable as it must hold for all τ ∈ [0, T ]. To
resolve this, it can be reduced to a finite collection of
more conservative constraints through constraint tightening.
A controller which implements the finite number of tightened
constraints, and thus renders (2) safe with respect to CI , is






s.t. Lfhτj (x) + Lghτj (x)u ≥ −α(hτj (x)− µ),
LfhB(x) + LghB(x)u ≥ −α(hB(x)),
for all τj ∈ {0,∆t, . . . , T}, where ∆t ∈ R>0 is a time-step





‖f(x) + g(x)kB(x)‖2, (10)
with Lh ∈ R>0 a Lipschitz constant for h on C [8, Thm. 1].
III. MEASUREMENT ROBUSTNESS
The guarantees endowed by the above controllers require
perfect knowledge of the state x, which often is an unrealistic
assumption in practice. In particular, the relationship between
the state of the system and the measurements, such as images
or point clouds, can be complex and not fully known [15],
[16], [17]. In this section we revisit measurement-model
uncertainty and present our main result in the form of a
measurement-robust version of the BS-QP.
A. Measurement-Model Uncertainty
To achieve robustness, we consider a structured form
of measurement-model uncertainty that modifies the CBF
condition (4) [14]. We assume the state x is not directly
available, but rather a state-dependent sensor measurement:
y = p(x), (11)
where y ∈ Rk and p : Rn → Rk is locally Lipschitz contin-
uous. An estimate of the state, x̂ ∈ Rn, is reconstructed
from y (such as through measurement models or data-
driven methods [16], [17]). In particular, we assume the map
from measurements to state estimates is imperfect (does not
recover the true state exactly), and is given by the locally
Lipschitz continuous function q̂ : Rk → Rn as follows:
x̂ , q̂(y) = x + e(x), (12)
where the state error function e : Rn → Rn is unknown and
implicitly defined by q̂.
The error function e can often be characterized via
upper bounds on measurement-model uncertainty. In par-
ticular, we assume that while the state error e(x) is not
known for a given state x ∈ Rn, it is within a com-
pact error set E(y) specified by a set-valued function
E : Rk → P(Rn) (P denotes the power set), that is, we have
e(x) ∈ E(y) = E(p(x)). The error set can be conservatively




Since the controller only has access to the measurement
and the state estimate, systems with measurement-model
uncertainty evolve according to:
ẋ = f(x) + g(x)k(y, x̂). (14)
The error bound can be used to synthesize controllers which
render such systems provably safe as follows [14]:
Theorem 2. Given a safe set C ⊂ Rn, assume that Lfh,
Lgh, and α ◦ h are Lipschitz continuous on C with Lipschitz
constants LLfh,LLgh, and Lα◦h ∈ R≥0, respectively. Define
the function ε : Rk → R≥0 as in (13), and define the func-
tions a, b : Rk → R≥0 as a(y) = (LLfh + Lα◦h)ε(y) and
b(y) = LLghε(y). If k : Rk × Rn → Rm is a Lipschitz
continuous controller satisfying:
Lfh(x̂) + Lgh(x̂)k(y, x̂)
− (a(y) + b(y)‖k(y, x̂)‖2) ≥ −α(h(x̂)) (15)
for all x ∈ C, with y = p(x) and x̂ = q̂(y), then the system
(14) is safe with respect to C.
A continuously differentiable function h : Rn → R for which
such a controller exists is termed a Measurement-Robust
Control Barrier Function (MR-CBF) [14]. As compared to
the original CBF constraint (4), the MR-CBF constraint (15)
adds additional terms incorporating bounds on the measure-
ment error that ensure the system is safe to all possible
states following from a given measurement. The original
CBF constraint is recovered in the absence of measurement
error (ε(y) = 0).
B. Measurement-Robust Backup Set Optimization Program
In this section we present our main result in the form of a
safety-critical control paradigm that is robust to measurement
uncertainty. This is accomplished by unifying the Backup Set
Fig. 2. Simulation results for a measurement model of x̂ = x− 0.4 m and constant desired velocity of 1 m/s. (Left) An image of the simulated Segway
model. (Center) Trajectories generated using the BS-QP. Solid line represents the true state, dashed line shows the estimated state, and green region
indicates the safe set C. The true trajectory fails to be safe and exits the safe set at t = 3 s. (Right) Trajectories generated using the MR-BS-OP. An
additional robustness region is plotted in blue to indicate the set of of true states which the control input renders safe. Both the true and measured trajectories
are safe demonstrating the robustness of the MR-BS-OP when compared to the BS-QP.
method with MR-CBFs, using the MR-CBF condition (15)
the finite set of constraints imposed in the BS-QP become:
Lfhτj (x̂) + Lghτj (x̂)u
− (aτj (y) + bτj (y)‖u‖2) ≥ −α(hτj (x̂)− µ),
LfhB(x̂) + LghB(x̂)u
− (aB(y) + bB(y)‖u‖2) ≥ −α(hB(x̂)),
(16)
with parameter functions:
aτj (y) = (LLfhτj
+ LαLhτj
)ε(y), bτj (y) = LLghτj
ε(y),
aB(y) = (LLfhB + LαLhB )ε(y), bB(y) = LLghB ε(y),
(17)
for all τj ∈ {0,∆t, . . . , T}, with ε(y) defined as in (13) and
L represents the Lipschitz constant of its subscripted function
on Rn. These constructions enable the following definition:
Definition 4 (Measurement-Robust Implicit Safe Set). The
set CI ⊆ C ⊆ Rn defined as in (7) is a Measurement-Robust
Implicit Safe Set (MRISS) for the error bound ε : Rk → R≥0
with parameter functions (a0, b0, . . . , a∆t , b∆t , aB , bB) :
Rk → R≥0 if:
• the functions {h0, h∆t , . . . , hT , hB}, their Lie deriva-
tives, and α are Lipschitz continuous on CI ,
• the constant µ ∈ R≥0 satisfies (10),
• and for all x ∈ CI there exists u ∈ Rm satisfying (16).
Next, using this definition, we show that the safety of such
sets can be made robust to measurement model uncertainty.
Theorem 3. Given a MRISS CI , if k : Rk × Rn → Rm is
a Lipschitz continuous controller that satisfies (16) with
parameter functions (17) for all x ∈ CI with y = p(x) and
x̂ = q̂(y), then system (14) is safe with with respect to CI .
Proof. For any function h ∈ {h0, h∆t , . . . , hT , hB} let
c(x,k(y, x̂)) = Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)k(y, x̂) + α(h(x)− ν),
where we choose ν = µ if h = hτj and ν = 0 if h = hB . It
follows by Lipschitz continuity that:
‖Lfh(x̂)− Lfh(x)‖2 ≤ LLfhε(y),
‖α(h(x̂)− ν)− α(h(x)− ν)‖2 ≤ LαLhε(y),
‖Lgh(x̂)− Lgh(x)‖2‖k(y, x̂)‖2 ≤ LLghε(y)‖k(y, x̂)‖2.
As k satisfies (16), we have that:
c(x,k(y, x̂))
= c(x̂,k(y, x̂)) + c(x,k(y, x̂))− c(x̂,k(y, x̂))
≥ c(x̂,k(y, x̂))− (a(y) + b(y)‖k(y, x̂)‖2) ≥ 0.
Since c(x,k(y, x̂)) ≥ 0 and µ satisfies (10), we have that the
system (14) is safe with respect to CI by [8, Lemma 2].
This result allows us to present an alternative to the BS-QP
controller which adds the measurement-robustness of MR-
CBFs. The constraints (16) can be directly integrated into
a Measurement-Robust Backup Set Optimization Program
controller MR-BS-OP as:





s.t. Lfhτj (x̂) + Lghτj (x̂)u
− (aτj (y) + bτj (y)‖u‖2) ≥ −α(hτj (x̂)− µ)
LfhB(x̂) + LghB(x̂)u
− (aB(y) + bB(y)‖u‖2) ≥ −α(hB(x̂))
for all τj ∈ {0,∆t, . . . , T}. This is a second-order cone
program (SOCP), and there exists a wide array of solvers
that are capable of implementing this controller including
ECOS [23]. Notably, the conservative nature of the method
scales with the bound on the measurement-model error ε(y)
and the MR-BS-OP reduces to the BS-QP when ε(y) = 0.
We remark that the feasibility of MR-BS-OP for all x̂ ∈ Rn
can be ensured by adding a slack variable to the optimization
problem. The impact of the slack variable on safety can be
understood via the concept of projection-to-state safety [24].
Fig. 3. Experimental results using SLAM measurement model from the Intel RealSense T265 and constant desired velocity of 1 m/s. (Left) An image of
the physical Segway platform. (Center) Trajectories generated using the BS-QP. Solid line represents the true state, dashed line shows the measured state,
and green region indicates the safe set C. The true trajectory fails to be safe and exits the safe set at t = 6.7 s. The measurement error is plotted in blue.
(Right) Trajectories generated using the MR-BS-OP. An additional robustness region is plotted in blue to indicate the set of true states which the control
input renders safe. Both the true and measured trajectories are safe demonstrating the robustness of the MR-BS-OP when compared to the BS-QP.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed
(MR-BS-OP) controller on a modified Ninebot E+ Segway
platform in both simulation and experimentally on hardware.
We consider a 4-dimensional asymmetrical Segway model
shown in Figures 2 and 3. The state of the system consists
of the position x, the forward velocity ẋ, the pitch angle
ψ, and the pitch rate ψ̇. The equations of motion were
derived using Newton-Euler method treating the Segway as
an inverted pendulum with control input as torque command
at the wheels; see [8]. The Backup Set method for generating
control invariant sets is particularly relevant for this system
due to its non-minimum phase dynamics.
The desired safe set was chosen to be the set of states with
position less than 2 m from the origin, i.e. C = {x ∈ Rn :
x ≤ 2} and h(x) = 2 − x. The backup controller was an
LQR controller on the linearized system dynamics and the
backup set was an estimate of the region of attraction of the
LQR controller to the upright equilibrium state, given by a
quadratic Lyapunov function. This set is then translated to
match the current position of the Segway, while not allowing
it to exceed the set boundary. The functions hτ , τ ∈ [0, T ]
were converted into four CBFs hτj . Lastly, the Lipschitz
constants for hτj were found explicitly by inspection of the
Segway dynamics and the Lipschitz constants for hB were
found by sampling the state space in simulation and taking
the largest numerical gradient.
Simulation Results. The MR-BS-OP was first validated
in simulation in a ROS-based environment, found here1.
Measurement-model uncertainty was achieved by artificially
adding a constant error of −0.4 m to the true state. The
simple test scenario involved driving the Segway forward
with a constant desired velocity of 1 m/s. As seen in Figure
2, the MR-BS-OP provided robustness to this error in this
setting. Importantly, without measurement-robustness, the
system would be unsafe due to uncertainty in the state.
Hardware Results. The MR-BS-OP was then implemented
on hardware. State estimates for ẋ, ψ, and ψ̇ were found
1Simulation code github.com/DrewSingletary/segway_sim
using wheel incremental encoders and a VectorNav VN-100
IMU. The position estimate for x was obtained from an Intel
RealSense T265 camera running proprietary Visual Inertial
Odometry (VIO) based SLAM. Onboard computation was
performed by a Jetson TX2 which computes control actions
and relays them to the low-level motor controllers. The TX2
concurrently runs Linux with ROS, enabling external com-
munication and logging, and the ERIKA3 real-time operating
system, which enables real-time low-level communication
and computation of the control action.
An OptiTrack motion capture system was used to provide
state estimates which are considered true. These closely
matched the encoder position estimates for short trials, so
the encoder x estimates are considered true in the outdoor
experiments. This data was used to determine the error
bound ε(y) that appears in the MR-CBF constraint. As the
(ẋ, ψ, ψ̇) state estimates provided by the encoders and IMU
are highly accurate, we focus on making the system robust
to measurement error in its vision-based position estimate x̂.
The value ε(y) = 0.4 was chosen as an upper bound on
the measurement error for all y ∈ p(C). The MR-BS-OP was
implemented at the embedded level in the ERIKA3 operating
system using the ECOS [23] SOCP solver. The desired con-
troller kd was a proportional-derivative controller tracking
user velocity inputs. The backup trajectory φkBτ (x̂) and its
partial derivatives were approximated via Euler integration
using a time step of ∆t = 5 ms and the time used to expand
the backup set CB to CI was T = 1 s. The MR-BS-OP ran
at 250 Hz with 5 decision variables, 4 linear constraints, and
6 second order cone constraints and saturated at ±20 Nm.
To demonstrate the method, a simple scenario is executed
on the Segway in which it is driven forward at its maximum
velocity of 1 m/s. This scenario is performed with both the
BS-QP and the MR-BS-OP. The results of these experiments
can be found in Figure 3, images from the experiment can
be seen in Figure 4, and a video can be found at [25]. With
the BS-QP controller the estimated state x̂ remains safe, but
the true state x becomes unsafe whereas with the MR-BS-
OP controller both the estimated and the true state are kept
safe. This highlights the importance of providing robustness
against measurement uncertainty, as achieved by Theorem 3.
Fig. 4. Images from the experiment using the MR-BS-OP controller. The Segway is piloted towards a wall of yellow boxes and the controller ensures that
it remains safe, i.e. that it does not crash into the boxes. (Top) Time lapse of the Segway trajectory. (Bottom) Camera images taken from the perspective
of the Segway across the experiment. The images are displayed in chronological order from left to right.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper established robust controller synthesis with
formal safety guarantees for systems relying on uncertain
measurements. We approached this problem through the
framework of CBFs. We additionally highlighted the im-
portance of control invariant sets and experimentally im-
plemented the Backup Set method to produce such a set
for a Segway. Our theoretical construction culminated in the
integration of the Backup Set method with MR-CBFs, which
provides robustness to state measurement uncertainty in the
safety guarantees. We implemented the proposed control
method on a Segway platform and demonstrated robustly safe
operation in experiments. Future work includes addressing
feasibility of the MR-BS-OP for general systems in the pres-
ence of probabilistic error bounds and developing methods
to determine the Lipschitz constants in its constraints.
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